Route-Based Detection of Conflicting ATC Clearances on Airports by Weiß, Benjamin et al.
  
 
Abstract — Runway incursions are among the most serious 
safety concerns in air traffic control. Traditional A-SMGCS 
level 2 safety systems detect runway incursions with the help of 
surveillance information only. In the context of SESAR, com-
plementary safety systems are emerging that also use other 
information in addition to surveillance, and that aim at warn-
ing about potential runway incursions at earlier points in time. 
One such system is “conflicting ATC clearances”, which pro-
cesses the clearances entered by the air traffic controller into 
an electronic flight strips system and cross-checks them for 
potentially dangerous inconsistencies. The cross-checking logic 
may be implemented directly based on the clearances and on 
surveillance data, but this is cumbersome. We present an ap-
proach that instead uses ground routes as an intermediate 
layer, thereby simplifying the core safety logic. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Preventing runway incursions is an important safety goal 
in air traffic control (ATC). As defined by ICAO [1], a run-
way incursion is “any occurrence at an aerodrome involving 
the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the 
protected area of a surface designated for the landing and 
take-off of aircraft”. We understand this to include all occur-
rences where the required runway separation between two 
mobiles (i.e., aircraft or vehicles) is lost, as well as all occur-
rences where a mobile is present on a runway without ATC 
permission (even if runway separation is maintained). The 
rules for runway separation are defined by ICAO [2] and 
local implementations thereof. For example, ICAO [2] de-
mands – roughly speaking – that at the moment when a 
departing aircraft commences take-off or when a landing 
aircraft overflies the runway threshold, there must be no 
traffic on the runway in front of it. If such a rule is violated, 
then this constitutes a runway incursion. 
Besides other safety provisions, one line of attack against 
runway incursions is to use automated systems that detect 
runway incursions or their precursors, and that warn air 
traffic controllers (ATCOs) and/or pilots and vehicle drivers 
about such situations [3],[4]. Traditionally, such systems are 
based exclusively on surveillance information: they contin-
uously monitor the positions and movement vectors of mo-
biles on and around runways, and emit a warning to the 
ATCO if a dangerous situation is unfolding. Such systems 
are known as runway incursion monitoring systems (RIMS), 
or as advanced surface movement guidance and control 
system (A-SMGCS) level 2 alerting systems [5],[6],[7]. 
RIMS can provide reliable warnings only on short notice, 
requiring an immediate ATCO reaction. In the context of the 
Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR) – 
and pioneered by EUROCONTROL's Integrated Tower 
Working Position (ITWP) project [8] – two new safety sys-
tems complementary to RIMS are emerging, which aim at 
warning about potential runway incursions at earlier points 
in time. The key to both systems, called conflicting ATC 
clearances (CATC) [9] and conformance monitoring [10], is 
that in addition to surveillance information, they also make 
use of the clearances entered by ATCOs into the system. In 
other words, they are made possible by the interaction of 
two functional areas that are traditionally allocated to sepa-
rate systems, namely a sensor data processing system deal-
ing with geographical positions of mobiles on the ground 
and in the air, and an electronic flight strips system dealing 
with flight plans and clearances. 
Where conformance monitoring is about checking wheth-
er a mobile's behaviour conforms to its clearance, CATC is 
about cross-checking clearances for consistency. For exam-
ple, a CATC system can detect if an aircraft A receives a 
“line up“ clearance while another aircraft B holds a “land“ 
clearance for the same runway, unless B has already passed 
the runway entry to be used by A, in which case no warning 
is given. The system thus guards against rare but potentially 
dangerous ATCO mistakes, where clearances are issued 
that, in combination, could lead to a violation of runway 
separation. A recent study suggests that as many as half of 
all European runway incursions may have such causes [11]. 
CATC safety logic can be implemented by directly mak-
ing use of surveillance and clearance information, but this 
involves lots of special case handling: is the runway entry of 
A in front of or behind the current position of B? What if 
there are intersecting runways? We describe an approach to 
CATC that is instead based on ground routing, i.e., on a 
separate system functionality that is concerned with the 
routes that mobiles take on the airport’s network of run-
ways, taxiways, apron taxilanes and parking stands. The 
availability of ground routes simplifies the CATC problem 
significantly: clearances can be mapped to routes by distin-
guishing between a cleared and a not-yet-cleared route part, 
and the core safety logic can then work with thus enhanced 
routes instead of directly with clearances and surveillance 
data. Essentially, it has to check for overlaps between 
cleared route segments on runways. 
Outline. In Section II, the concept of CATC is described 
in more detail. We provide background on ground routing in 
Section III, before presenting the route-based approach to 
CATC in Section IV. Section V describes how conditional 
clearances can be handled. Section VII is about the presenta-
tion of warnings in a human machine interface, and Sec-
tion VII gives an outlook on a possible future extension to 
trajectory-based CATC. Section VIII contains conclusions. 
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II. CONFLICTING ATC CLEARANCES 
This section defines the “clearance conflicts” that are to 
be detected by the CATC system. Our definition roughly 
follows the one in [9]. We consider four types of runway-
related ATC clearances: line up (LUP), cross (CRS), take-off 
(TOF) and land (LND). Based on these four, we define one 
type of conflict for every unordered pair of clearance types: 
 LUP/LUP: two aircraft are cleared to line up from 
opposing runway entries on the same end of a run-
way; or: two aircraft are cleared to line up on oppo-
site ends of the same runway (*); or: two aircraft are 
cleared to line up on the same or adjacent runway en-
tries on the same runway, and multiple line-up is not 
authorised (*). 
 LUP/CRS: one aircraft is cleared to line up and an-
other mobile is cleared to cross the same runway 
from an opposing runway entry. 
 LUP/TOF: one aircraft is cleared to line up and an-
other is cleared to take off on the same runway, and 
the runway entry of the aircraft lining up is in front of 
the position of the aircraft taking off. 
 LUP/LND: one aircraft is cleared to line up and an-
other is cleared to land on the same runway, and the 
runway entry of the aircraft lining up is in front of the 
position of the landing aircraft, and the landing air-
craft is not expected to vacate the runway before the 
line up point. 
 CRS/CRS: two mobiles are cleared to cross the same 
runway from opposing runway entries. 
 CRS/TOF: one mobile is cleared to cross and another 
is cleared to take off on the same runway, and the 
runway entry of the crossing mobile is in front of the 
position of the aircraft taking off. 
 CRS/LND: one mobile is cleared to cross and another 
is cleared to land on the same runway, and the run-
way entry of the crossing mobile is in front of the po-
sition of the landing aircraft, and the landing aircraft 
is not expected to vacate the runway before the cross-
ing point. 
 TOF/TOF: two aircraft are cleared to take off on the 
same runway. 
 TOF/LND: one aircraft is cleared to take off and an-
other is cleared to land on the same runway. 
 LND/LND: two aircraft are cleared to land on the 
same runway. 
The meaning of (*) is explained in Section IV.  
Above and elsewhere in this paper, the term “runway” re-
fers to a physical runway surface on the airport, for which 
there may be several runway thresholds. This implies that 
the above definitions of the LUP/TOF, LUP/LND, 
TOF/TOF and LND/LND conflicts also apply to movements 
that use opposite thresholds of the same runway. For exam-
ple, a situation where two aircraft are cleared to land on 
thresholds “05” and “23” of runway “05/23” constitutes a 
LND/LND conflict. 
The definition above only takes into account conflict situ-
ations on a single runway. We extend it to intersecting run-
ways by stipulating that TOF/TOF, TOF/LND and 
LND/LND conflicts also occur if the two respective aircraft 
are cleared not on the same runway but on intersecting run-
ways and if their trajectories are converging, i.e., if both will 
move towards the intersection, not away from it. We do not 
consider converging but non-intersecting runways here.  
In principle, a detection mechanism for clearance con-
flicts can be implemented directly along the lines of the 
above definition. However, in this paper we argue that it is 
advantageous to instead base the detection on ground routes. 
III. GROUND ROUTING 
Safety support mechanisms such as CATC constitute one 
functional area in the context of A-SMGCS or tower ATC 
systems. Another functional area is ground routing, where 
the system maintains the routes that mobiles are planned to 
follow on the airport's network of runways, taxiways, apron 
taxilanes and parking stands. System knowledge about these 
routes is an essential enabler for several other system func-
tionalities. For example, possible functionalities that depend 
on route information are conformance monitoring, which 
warns if a mobile deviates from its assigned route; automatic 
switching of airport lighting to guide aircraft from their 
parking stand to the runway or vice versa; or the computa-
tion of accurate individual taxi time estimates to be used e.g. 
by a departure management planning system. 
In this paper, we propose to use routes for CATC as well. 
To this end, we assume in Section IV that there is a route for 
every mobile that may receive a runway-related ATC clear-
ance, and that this route matches ATCO intent. It is not 
relevant how the routes in the system actually come to be. 
Conceivable possibilities include manual input by the 
ATCO; a range of automatic approaches, from table-based 
lookup via simple shortest-path search algorithms to more 
complex time-based optimisation algorithms; or combi-
nations thereof. See e.g. [12] for a literature survey, or [13] 
for an example of recent research in the area. 
We define the notion of a route based on a segmentation 
of the airport map, i.e., a partitioning of the movement area 
into non-overlapping polygons called segments, such that 
every segment can be considered atomic for the purposes of 
routing. An example is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Airport segmentation; colors serve to highlight segment 
boundaries 
  
Figure 1 depicts a possible segmentation of the north-
eastern corner of Hamburg airport. We see the northeastern 
end of runway 05/23, with four runway entry taxiways lead-
ing onto the runway from its south-east and one from its 
north-west. In the bottom right part of the figure some park-
ing stands are visible. The segmentation is chosen such that 
every intersection between runways, taxiways and/or park-
ing stands has its own segment, and such that there is a 
segment boundary at every holding line. 
Given such a segmentation of the airport, we can under-
stand a route abstractly as a sequence of segments. An ex-
ample for a route in this sense is visualised in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Ground route, consisting of those airport segments 
(shown as circles) that are colored green or blue 
 
The route depicted in Figure 2 leads an aircraft from its 
current position on a parking stand (the segment on the right 
marked with a dot inside the green circle) first through a 
pushback and then to runway 05/23, and finally down that 
runway, representing take-off from logical runway 23. 
Given polygonal paths that model the centerlines of taxi-
ways and runways, one can derive from a route (i.e., from a 
sequence of segments) a smooth polygonal path corres-
ponding to the route, by composing the centerline parts that 
belong to the route’s segments. Such a polygonal path can 
e.g. be used to visualise the route in a human machine inter-
face (HMI). An example is shown in Figure 3. Our CATC 
detection approach uses only the abstract route, not the cor-
responding polygonal path. 
We assume that the route of an arriving aircraft initially 
starts at the runway threshold and ends at the parking stand, 
and that conversely, the route of a departing aircraft initially 
starts at its parking stand and ends at the far end of the take-
off runway. Additionally, we assume that the routing sub-
system continuously updates routes based on surveillance 
information, such that for a mobile that is proceeding to 
move along its route, the route always starts in the segment 
corresponding to its current position. A consequence of this 
is that the availability of accurate surveillance data is a nec-
essary prerequisite for the availability of accurate routes, 
and that using routes for further purposes – such as CATC – 
implies using surveillance data. 
When a mobile has both a clearance such as LUP, CRS, 
TOF or LND and a route, we can distinguish between an 
initial cleared part of the route that the mobile already has 
been allowed to execute, and the subsequent planned part 
that it is not yet permitted to execute. If a segment belongs 
to the cleared part of a mobile’s route, we say that the mo-
bile is cleared for the segment. 
Roughly, for a LUP clearance, the cleared part of a route 
consists of all route segments up to and onto the take-off 
runway, but not yet down the runway. For a CRS clearance, 
it includes the route segments onto and beyond the first 
runway that the route crosses. For a TOF clearance, the 
cleared part is the entire route up to the end of the take-off 
runway, and for a LND clearance, it consists of all segments 
of the landing runway up to the planned runway exit. For 
example, the aircraft of Figures 2 and 3 currently has a LUP 
clearance. The cleared part of the route is shown in green in 
Figure 2, and as a solid line in Figure 3. The part of the 
route that the aircraft is not yet cleared for is shown in blue 
in Figure 2, and as a dashed line in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Polygonal path corresponding to the route of Figure 2, 
displayed in a tower controller HMI 
 
IV. ROUTE-BASED CATC DETECTION 
Looking again at the description of CATC in Section II, 
but ignoring the two cases marked with (*) for the moment, 
we can observe that the various conflict type definitions all 
follow one of two basic patterns. The first pattern is that for 
a mobile with a TOF or LND clearance, there is a conflict 
with any other mobile whose clearance permits it to use the 
runway ahead of the taking off or landing aircraft. It does 
not matter what clearance the other mobile has, or what 
direction it is moving in.  
The second pattern underlies those conflicts that involve 
neither a TOF nor a LND clearance, i.e., conflicts only be-
tween LUP and/or CRS. For these “slow” clearances, there 
is a conflict only if the clearances allow the mobiles to meet 
on the runway while moving in different directions. Several 
overlapping movements in the same direction do not consti-
tute a conflict; think e.g. of multiple aircraft consecutively 
crossing a runway from the same runway entry. 
Using the terminology of Section III, these patterns can 
together be phrased as: there is a conflict between two mo-
biles if there is a runway segment for which both are 
cleared, unless (1) both clearances are either LUP or CRS 
and (2) both mobiles approach the runway segment in ques-
tion from the same direction. We say that two mobiles “ap-
  
proach a segment from the same direction” if the segment 
preceding the one in question is the same in both mobiles’ 
routes. 
Our approach is to use this unified, route-based formula-
tion of CATC as the conflict detection logic. The pseudo-
code below determines the conflicts that a given mobile A is 
involved in: 
  for every runway segment S on A’s cleared route part: 
    for every mobile B ≠ A also cleared for S: 
      if not (A and B both have LUP or CRS clearance 
                 and both approach S from the same direction): 
         report conflict between A and B 
The type of a thus detected conflict is determined by the 
clearances of the involved mobiles A and B. For example, if 
one of them has a LND clearance and the other a LUP clear-
ance, then the conflict is a LUP/LND conflict. 
The following examples are intended to illustrate that the 
above detection logic matches the conflict definitions in 
Section II, without the cases marked with (*). A first exam-
ple situation is depicted in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Example situation with two aircraft A and B and associ-
ated ground routes; the routes meet at the intersection and overlap 
in all segments further down the runway 
 
Whether there is a conflict in the situation of Figure 4 de-
pends on the clearances of A and B. If, for example, A and 
B both have LUP clearances, then there is no conflict, be-
cause there is no runway segment that both are cleared for. 
If, on the other hand, A has LUP clearance and B has TOF 
or LND clearance, then there is a LUP/TOF or a LUP/LND 
conflict, respectively, because there are runway segments 
that both aircraft are cleared for. In the terminology of Sec-
tion II, the conflict occurs because the runway entry of A is 
in front of the position of B. If B moves down the runway 
beyond A’s runway entry, then eventually the routes stop 
overlapping and the situation becomes conflict-free. 
Figure 5 shows a second example situation. After joining 
paths on a taxiway, aircraft A and B approach their single 
shared runway segment from the same direction. If A has 
TOF clearance and B has CRS clearance, then there is a 
CRS/TOF conflict. But if A instead has LUP clearance, then 
there is no LUP/CRS conflict. Such a conflict would occur 
only if B were moving along its route in the opposite direc-
tion, because then, the two aircraft would be approaching 
their shared runway segment from different directions. 
 
Figure 5: Second example situation; the routes of A and B overlap 
in exactly one runway segment 
 
One of the advantages of the route-based approach is that 
it immediately works for intersecting runways, too. Imagine, 
for example, a pair of intersecting runways. Two aircraft 
with TOF or LND clearances for the two runways create a 
TOF/TOF, TOF/LND or LND/LND conflict, as desired, as 
they are both cleared to use the intersection segment shared 
by both runways. And, as desired, the conflict is resolved 
when one of them passes the intersection, because then the 
routes do not overlap anymore. A screenshot of a LND/LND 
conflict on intersecting runways is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: LND/LND conflict on intersecting runways, in an HMI 
  
The definitions in Section II specify that LUP/LND and 
CRS/LND conflicts only occur if the landing aircraft is not 
“expected” to vacate the runway before the runway entry 
used by the second aircraft. They do not further specify what 
constitutes such an “expectation”. The matter is tricky, be-
cause it is possible that aircraft miss their assigned runway 
exit, e.g. due to bad braking conditions. In the above ap-
  
proach, we consider the routes to be the manifestations of 
the expectations that are to be used for CATC. The routing 
mechanism might ensure that by default, all landing aircraft 
have routes where they vacate at the very end of the runway, 
and if an ATCO expects the use of an earlier exit, he or she 
may change the route accordingly. Alternatively, one could 
extend the definition and implementation of CATC with 
some distinction between uncertain expectations (say, the 
runway exit planned to be used by a still-airborne aircraft) 
and expectations with a higher degree of confidence (such as 
the runway exit planned to be used by an aircraft that has 
already touched down and decelerated, or perhaps by an 
aircraft with a reliable “brake to vacate” system). 
We have so far ignored the cases of the LUP/LUP defini-
tion that are marked with (*) in Section II, i.e., the cases 
where two aircraft line up on opposite runway ends, or 
where they line up behind each other and where this is disal-
lowed by local rules. These conflicts follow a different idea 
than the others: in all other conflicts, one can imagine situa-
tions where, if the two aircraft do what their clearances 
allow them to do, this would lead to a collision on the run-
way. In contrast, the worry behind the cases marked with (*) 
has more to do with the fact that LUP is usually followed by 
TOF, and that the TOF clearance in these cases would be 
problematic. Supporting these cases in our CATC detection 
logic requires adding a special case, which is nevertheless 
easy to express using routes: if A’s clearance is LUP, then 
we do not only check the cleared part of its route, but also 
the not-yet-cleared runway segments that belong to its take-
off, and we report a conflict if there is another aircraft that 
holds a LUP clearance for any of these runway segments. 
V. CONDITIONAL CLEARANCES 
A special form of clearances on airports are conditional 
clearances, i.e., clearances that become effective only when 
a certain condition is satisfied. Most frequently, the clear-
ance in question is a LUP or CRS clearance, and the condi-
tion is that a landing or taking off aircraft must have passed 
the runway entry point to be used for lining up or crossing, 
respectively. Conditional clearances may be used by ATCOs 
to inform pilots about clearances “in advance”, giving them 
the permission to start the corresponding movement at a 
later point in time, namely when the pilot is certain that the 
specified other aircraft has passed his own. 
In CATC detection, a conditional clearance must be treat-
ed differently from a regular clearance. For example, a con-
ditional LUP clearance to line up behind a landing aircraft 
should not create a LUP/LND conflict between the two 
aircraft. In a CATC sense, a conditional clearance is not 
really a clearance at all until the moment when the attached 
condition is fulfilled. At this point in time, it turns into a 
regular, unconditional clearance.  
The CATC logic can be used to automatically determine 
this moment, and to then automatically remove the condition 
in the flight strip. This should happen as soon as doing so 
does not create a clearance conflict with the “condition” 
aircraft. For example, the system can thus automatically 
update a conditional LUP clearance to a proper LUP clear-
ance at the precise moment when the landing aircraft named 
in the condition has passed the runway entry point, i.e., at 
the first moment when this update does not create a 
LUP/LND conflict between the two aircraft anymore.  
VI. HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACE 
In order to inform ATCOs about detected CATC con-
flicts, warnings may be displayed in sensor data processing 
and/or electronic flight strips HMIs. We have already seen 
an example for the former in Figure 6. An example for a 
warning in an electronic flight strip is shown in Figure 7 
below, where a CRS/TOF warning is attached to the strip of 
flight “DLH017”. The same warning would also be attached 
to the strip of the second mobile involved in the conflict. 
 
Figure 7: Clearance conflict warning in flight strip 
 
Warnings may be displayed on all the different controller 
working positions (e.g. Ground Delivery, Apron Controller, 
Taxi Controller, Runway Controller, Supervisor Controller, 
etc.). It may be possible to turn on and off the presentation 
individually on every working position. 
Conditional clearances should be displayed such that the 
difference to regular clearances is clearly visible. One at-
tempt to do this is shown in Figure 8, where the conditional 
clearance of flight “FDX111” to line-up behind flight 
“SAS638” is indicated by the callsign of “SAS638” being 
shown in red letters above the label of “FDX111”. 
 
Figure 8: Conditional clearance in flight strip 
 
The CATC warnings shown in Figures 6 and 7 are about 
current conflicts, i.e., conflicts between currently active 
clearances. These warnings typically appear as soon as an 
ATCO enters a clearance that is in conflict with another one. 
It is also possible to display warnings about future conflicts, 
before the corresponding clearance gets entered into the 
system. Such predictive warnings could help ATCOs to 
avoid a mistake before it even happens. 
For predictive warnings, the system can internally use the 
standard CATC logic to check whether certain clearances 
would lead to conflicts or not. This may be done on-demand 
– perhaps when a menu displaying possible clearances gets 
opened in the HMI – or periodically for all clearances that 
can possibly or likely be issued in  the current situation.  
An example for a predictive indication is shown in Fig-
ure 9 below, where a green “probe light” is displayed on the 
upper right corner of the button that ATCOs use for entering 
the “expected” next clearance, i.e., the one that will typically 
be next in the workflow on the airport. This tells the ATCO 
that giving this clearance at the current moment in time will 
not lead to a clearance conflict. If giving the next expected 
clearance would lead to a conflict, then the strip is shown 
with a red probe light on the clearance entry button instead 
of a green one; an example for this can be seen in Figure 8 
above, where the label of “FDX111” has a red probe light 
  
because giving it the next expected clearance (i.e., TOF) 
would create a TOF/TOF conflict with “SAS638”. 
 
Figure 9:  Flight strip with green “probe light”, indicating that 
giving the next clearance now will not create a clearance conflict 
 
VII. TRAJECTORY-BASED CATC DETECTION 
The definitions in Section II aim at warning about situa-
tions where a pair of clearances could lead to a safety prob-
lem, such as a violation of runway separation. They are by 
nature an approximation: the presence of a conflict does not 
imply that there will necessarily be a problem. In particular, 
it is an approximation in that the dimension of time is ab-
stracted away completely. Consider e.g. a CRS/LND con-
flict: if the crossing mobile is already about to vacate the 
runway, and if the landing aircraft is still minutes away from 
the airport, the situation may be safe and acceptable accord-
ing to the rules of runway separation. If in practice there are 
too many such warnings about situations that ATCOs con-
sider to actually be safe, then this could severely limit the 
overall practical usefulness of the safety system.  
From our perspective, it remains to be studied how ade-
quate the degree of approximation of the current CATC 
concept as described in Section II and in [9] is in practice. It 
is clear already that a significant amount of “fine-tuning” 
will be needed to adjust the conflict definitions to the local 
rules or customs of an individual country or airport. Beyond 
that, we feel that it may be necessary to more generally 
extend the concept of CATC to take into account the dimen-
sion of time. The route-based approach appears well suited 
for such an extension: based on predicting the times at 
which mobiles are expected to reach the segments of their 
routes, one could extend the two-dimensional routes to two-
plus-one-dimensional trajectories that include time in addi-
tion to geographical information. Based on these trajectories 
and on a precise model of the applicable set of rules for 
runway separation (which can be somewhat complicated), 
one could create a system that warns about a pair of clear-
ances only if the pair is expected to lead to a violation of the 
required runway separation, or if – using a probabilistic 
model – it does not appear sufficiently likely that runway 
separation will be maintained throughout. 
The vertical dimension may be of interest, too: for exam-
ple, the notion of CATC may be extended to conflicts for 
converging but non-intersecting runways, where the prob-
lem is in the surrounding airspace rather than on the run-
ways themselves. Thus, ultimately, a CATC system may be 
based on 4D trajectories, mainly on their ground parts but 
also on the parts in the vicinity of the airport. Such a CATC 
system is then closely related to medium-term conflict detec-
tion (MTCD) systems [14] in en-route ATC, which – based 
on clearances and predicted trajectories – warn about en-
route aircraft that might get too close in the future. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We have presented an approach for detecting conflicting 
ATC clearances on airports based on ground routes. Using 
ground routes – which are a central enabler for many other 
functions in future airport ATC systems, too – allows for a 
rather simple core safety logic that immediately also works 
for less obvious cases like intersecting runways. A route-
based approach is also naturally suited for a future extension 
to a trajectory-based conflict detection, which would be 
more complex but could also be more accurate in avoiding 
superfluous warnings. 
The route-based approach has been implemented proto-
typically as an extension of the DFS PHOENIX sensor data 
processing system [15] and the DFS SHOWTIME electronic 
flight strips system [16], and the prototype has been used in 
a SESAR validation trial about conflicting ATC clearances 
conducted at Hamburg airport [17]. 
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